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Abstract—Clock synchronization has become essential to mod-
ern societies since many critical infrastructures depend on a
precise notion of time. This paper analyzes security aspects
of high-precision clock synchronization protocols, particularly
their alleged protection against delay attacks when clock syn-
chronization traffic is encrypted using standard network security
protocols such as IPsec, MACsec, or TLS. We use the Precision
Time Protocol (PTP), the most widely used protocol for high-
precision clock synchronization, to demonstrate that statistical
traffic analysis can identify properties that support selective
message delay attacks even for encrypted traffic. We furthermore
identify a fundamental conflict in secure clock synchronization
between the need of deterministic traffic to improve precision and
the need to obfuscate traffic in order to mitigate delay attacks.
A theoretical analysis of clock synchronization protocols iso-
lates the characteristics that make these protocols vulnerable to
delay attacks and argues that such attacks cannot be prevented
entirely but only be mitigated. Knowledge of the underlying com-
munication network in terms of one-way delays and knowledge
on physical constraints of these networks can help to compute
guaranteed maximum bounds for slave clock offsets. These
bounds are essential for detecting delay attacks and minimizing
their impact. In the general case, however, the precision that
can be guaranteed in adversarial settings is orders of magnitude
lower than required for high-precision clock synchronization in
critical infrastructures, which, therefore, must not rely on a
precise notion of time when using untrusted networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
CLOCK synchronization protocols have become an es-sential building block of numerous applications that
rely on a precise notion of time. The deployment of clock
synchronization for controlling system clocks of critical appli-
cations in telecommunication, industrial automation, financial
markets, avionics, or energy distribution has increased the
dependency of critical infrastructures on clocks synchronized
with increasingly high precision. Many processes, especially
in measurement, control, telecommunications, industrial and
financial applications are not only sensitive to errors in the value
domain but also to errors in the time domain. Examples for strict
dependencies on precise time are safety-critical applications
in the Smart Grid, which require an accuracy of 1 to 100 µs
(10 µs in case of current differential line protection with high
fault current sensitivity [1, 2]) or MiFID II in the financial
sector, requiring an accuracy of up to 100 µs [3, 4, 5]. Cellular
networks also have strong requirements for synchronized clocks
(≤ 1 µs) [6]. Errors in clock synchronization can lead to wrong
timings and may therefore originate faulty sensor reports,
endanger control decisions, and adversely affect the overall
functionality of a wide range of (critical) services that depend
on accurate time.
In recent years, security of clock synchronization received
increased attention as various attacks on clock synchronization
protocols (and countermeasures) were proposed. For this
reason, clock synchronization protocols need to be secured
whenever used outside of fully trusted network environments.
Clock synchronization protocols are specifically susceptible to
delay attacks since the times when messages are sent and
received have an actual effect on the receiver’s notion of
time. Delay attacks specifically can degrade the precision of
clock synchronization such that applications depending on it
may malfunction. Such malfunctioning is endangering critical
infrastructures that increasingly depend on a precise notion of
time.
Encrypting and signing clock synchronization messages
(with IPsec [7], MACsec [8], or TLS [9]) is commonly
recommended in order to provide security against a wealth of
network-based attacks. In this paper, we show that encryption
alone cannot provide sufficient security against delay attacks
on high-precision clock synchronization, which highlights
the insecurity of numerous applications (including critical
infrastructures) that depend on a precise notion of time. We
present a fundamental limitation of clock synchronization over
untrusted networks that is independent of the actual clock
synchronization protocol and communication network and even
holds when the communication is (supposedly) secured.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• Precision Time Protocol (PTP) traffic detection by
statistical analysis: We present a method for statistical
traffic analysis of PTP’s 2-step mode that allows to identify
PTP traffic even if it is encrypted and transmitted together
with other traffic. We show that some statistical properties
(length, timing, and direction) are sufficient to identify
PTP traffic and the particular PTP message types with very
high probability — even when the traffic is encrypted.
• Selective message delay attacks on encrypted traffic:
Using the properties identified in the traffic analysis, we
design and implement selective message delay attacks on
encrypted traffic. This shows that delay attacks can be
conducted on PTP even when it is (supposedly) secured
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with state-of-the-art network encryption schemes such as
IPsec, MACsec, or TLS.
• Countermeasures: We discuss countermeasures against
traffic analysis (length padding, timing randomization),
selective message delay attacks (strict replay protection),
and asymmetric link delay attacks (One-Way Delay
(OWD) limits).
• General clock synchronization limitations in adversar-
ial settings: We analyze the theoretical foundations that
make clock synchronization protocols susceptible to delay
attacks and identify the main vulnerability to be the delay
compensation mechanism, which is necessary to achieve
high precision. This leads us to asymmetric link delay
attacks that cannot be prevented by encryption. While
additional knowledge of the underlying communication
network can bound the maximum impact of delay attacks,
we argue that clock synchronization protocols cannot be
designed in a way that prevents asymmetric link delay
attacks entirely.
The resulting bounds, which we found based on our analysis,
do not satisfy requirements with respect to high-precision
clock synchronization. Therefore, high precision can only be
guaranteed on trusted networks.
II. BACKGROUND
Each clock has a natural drift caused by the non-ideality of
physical oscillators such an oscillator’s frequency affected by
temperature. The aim of clock synchronization is to keep clocks
within acceptable boundaries. Currently, there are two widely
used technologies for high-precision clock synchronization:
(1) the satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS) for
Pulses per Second (PPS) synchronization to global Universal
Time Coordinated (UTC), and PTP targeted for network-based
clock synchronization to a local clock. The main disadvantages
of GPS PPS are that it is operated by a single entity (the
US Air Force) and that it requires free view on at least four
satellites1, which might be difficult to get (in data centers for
example). Moreover, the (public) GPS signal is not secured
so that it may be spoofed with reasonable effort [10]. Due to
the missing backchannel to satellites, GPS is conceptionally
different to the Network Time Protocol (NTP) and PTP. In
this paper, we focus on PTP because it can achieve extremely
high precision, is widely used, and is more similar to other
clock synchronization protocols such as NTP. Most of the
findings in this paper, however, are applicable to other clock
synchronization protocols as well.
PTP [11] (or IEEE 1588) is designed to provide high-
precision clock synchronization in the order of microseconds
or even sub-microseconds. PTP achieves such high precision
mainly by reducing the impact of delay variation in to the hosts’
operating systems. For this purpose, Network Interface Cards
(NICs) with dedicated PTP hardware support can precisely
timestamp PTP messages at send and receive times in order
1View to four GPS satellites is the requirement for GPS-PPS signal
generation in the general case. However, from a theoretical point of view, one
single satellite in view is sufficient whenever the exact GPS antenna position
is known
to eliminate software uncertainty. PTP assumes trustworthy
and somewhat deterministic networks with low latency that
are entirely under control of the operator. It can be run over a
Local Area Network (LAN) via Ethernet or over a Wide Area
Network (WAN) via UDP.
New applications that require increasingly precise clock
synchronization lead to PTP being deployed also in critical
infrastructures and other areas that PTP has not been designed
for specifically. Base stations in mobile networks that depend
on highly accurate time are a prominent example. Originally,
manufacturers used GPS PPS to synchronize clocks. Nowadays
manufacturers also offer PTP as an alternative that is widely
used. Given the fact that base stations typically use WANs
to connect to their core network, employing PTP contradicts
the original assumptions of being used within LANs. In this
way, new attack vectors are created such as the delay attacks
presented in this paper. More examples include but are not
limited to areas such as Smart Grids or financial applications.
A. The Two Phases in Clock Synchronization
Clock synchronization algorithms aim at synchronizing a
slave clock to a master clock by exchanging timestamped
messages over packet-switched networks. In this paper we
assume that the master’s clock is accurate and reliable. Details
on how the master implements and accesses such a reliable
clock are out of scope of this paper. Network-based clock
synchronization protocols depend on two distinct phases that
will be discussed below: (a) clock offset measurement and (b)
delay measurement.
a) Clock Offset Measurement Phase: The goal of the
clock offset measurement phase is to calculate the relative
difference between the slave and master clocks. Clock offset
can either be measured in a single message (1-step mode)
supported by both NTP and PTP or in two messages (2-step
mode) supported by PTP. In any case, the master sends a SYNC
message to the slaves, and the slave records the transmitting
time tM1. In 1-step mode the SYNC message contains the
transmitting timestamp (tM1), in two-step mode the SYNC
message is just used as a marker, and the FOLLOW UP message
contains the exact point in time when the SYNC message left
the master (tM1). This way, higher precision may be achieved.
Fig. 1 depicts the 2-step clock offset measurement and delay
measurement.
b) Delay Measurement Phase: The SYNC and
FOLLOW UP messages are subject to various delay. These
delays are added to (and therefore negatively affect) the
measured clock offset. The overall delay consists of
transmission delays, queuing delays, processing delays, and
propagation delays, which themselves consist of constant and
stochastic parts2. The goal of the delay measurement phase
is to measure the overall delay and to subtract it from the
measured clock offset in order to derive the actual clock offset
as precisely as possible.
In PTP a delay measurement consists of two messages, one
sent from the slave to the master (DELAY REQUEST) where
2There is some constant delay for a given route and message size and
stochastic delay that mainly depends on other traffic and states of network
devices.
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Fig. 1. 2-step clock synchronization with deterministic and symmetric delays
and initial clock offset of 10 time units.
the slave records the transmitting time tS3 and a subsequent
message from the master to the slave (DELAY RESPONSE)
that includes the time instant when the DELAY REQUEST was
received at the master (tM4). Eventually, the slave knows four
timestamps: tM1, tS2, tS3, and tM4. The slave calculates the
network Round-Trip Delay (RTD) by measuring the OWDs in
both directions (see Eq. 1). The RTD is calculated as the sum
of the delay from master to slave (tS2 − tM1) and the delay
from slave to master (tM4− tS3). The OWD are approximated
as RTD2 , assuming symmetric OWDs.
RTD = tS2 − tM1 + tM4 − tS3 (1)
B. Clock Offset Calculation
For simplicity reasons, in the following example we assume
that master and slave clocks do not drift. The initial clock
offset is 10 time units such that the local timestamp tM1 = 0
on the master corresponds to the local timestamp tS0 = 10
on the slave (from an external observer’s point of view). The
OWDs are 2 time units in each direction. The slave calculates
its clock offset to the master according to Eq. (2).
offset = tS2 − tM1 − RTD
2
(2)
Eq. (2) consists of the uncorrected clock offset (tS2 − tM1)
corrected with the OWD that is approximated by halving the
RTD (Eq. 1). In this specific example, the slave calculates the
OWD as 2 and the clock offset as 10. Now the slave knows
that its clock is 10 time units ahead of the master and can
adjust accordingly. In real-world scenario, all physical clocks
are subject to drift so that the process of offset correction needs
to be run repeatedly in order to achieve a common notion of
time.
III. THREAT MODEL
The goal of the adversary is to make slaves adhere to
false clock values or to degrade the precision of the clock
synchronization to such an extent that it cannot be considered
high-precision anymore. We define high-precision that for every
time instant i : |tSi − tMi|≤ 10 µs holds, and the goal of the
adversary is to disturb this synchronicity of the master and
slave clocks at some instant.
We assume that the adversary is in a privileged Man in the
Middle (MITM) position in the network, by having gained
access to a network node or a link of the communication
path, or by conducting an ARP poisoning attack for example.
The adversary can, therefore, selectively manipulate, capture,
and delay any packet on the communication network, in
particular any clock synchronization packet that master and
slave exchange. We assume the communication between master
and slaves to be confidential and integrity-protected such that
the adversary can neither read nor modify the communication
in the value domain but can only modify the time domain.
The computational power of the adversary is limited but not
necessarily bound to that of the master or the slaves. I.e., the
adversary can use more powerful devices and larger storage.
IV. DELAY ATTACKS
Whenever clock synchronization messages are neither en-
crypted nor integrity-protected, an adversary can attack clock
synchronization protocols in the value domain, i.e., the adver-
sary modifies the timestamp values included in the messages.
This is a well-studied field and various countermeasures have
been proposed to secure clock synchronization against attacks
in the value domain such as encrypting the communication
(with MACsec, IPsec, or TLS) or employing digital signatures
to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the communication.
To conduct an attack in the time domain an adversary
intercepts clock synchronization messages and delays them
artificially for some time before forwarding3. The maliciously
introduced delay can be constant, variable, or even random,
and the slave clock can be manipulated this way [12]. Since
the clock synchronization protocol has no information about
the underlying communication network, one fundamental
prerequisite and assumption of PTP is symmetric network delay
between master and slave. I.e., the OWD from master to slave
is identical to the OWD from slave to master. Delay attacks
exploit this assumption of symmetric delay by maliciously
introducing asymmetry such that the slave synchronizes to an
inaccurate time.
The goal of delay attacks is to maliciously manipulate one of
the two messages that are crucial to clock offset measurement
and delay measurement: SYNC and DELAY REQUEST. While
other network-based attacks are important as well, delay attacks
and especially countermeasures against delay attacks on clock
synchronization have not been studied in required depth yet.
This paper focuses on this gap in research — delay attacks
and their impact on clock synchronization’s precision.
As we will show in Section VI and VIII, delay attacks
are feasible despite security measures in place (i.e., traffic
being encrypted and integrity-protected). Encrypting traffic
is not sufficient, mainly because successful verification of a
3Theoretically delay attacks can also be conducted by accelerating messages
(instead of delaying them). To conduct such acceleration attack, the adversary
needs to delay all messages by default and selectively forward some messages
with less delay in order to achieve an acceleration effect. Another option to
accelerate messages would be to route them through faster paths if the attacker
has this option.
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Fig. 2. PTP clock synchronization with delayed DELAY REQUEST message.
message’s integrity only certifies the correctness of the (sending
time reported in the) message but not of its effective propagation
time through the network [13]. For this reason, the delay attacks
can also be conducted on encrypted and integrity-protected
traffic. The assumption of symmetric OWDs is essential to
the delay attacks presented in this paper as those exploit non-
deterministic delays in communication networks.
Asymmetric OWDs have a direct effect on the precision of
clock synchronization. The effect of asymmetric OWDs on
clock synchronization is depicted in Fig. 2 and 3. In Fig. 2, the
messages from master to slave take 2 time units while those
from slave to master take 8. The slave therefore calculates the
clock offset according to Eq. 2 as 7, which is off from the actual
offset (10). In this example, the slave clock remains 3 time units
ahead of the master’s because of the asymmetric delay in the
DELAY REQUEST message. If the SYNC message, on the other
hand, takes longer than the DELAY REQUEST message (Fig. 3),
the slave miscalculates the clock offset (again according to
Eq. 2) as 13 so that the slave corrects its clock too much
and its clock is then behind the master’s. Such asymmetric
delays are an inherent part of packet-switched communication
networks as transmission delays, propagation delays, queuing
delays, and processing delays are never entirely symmetric4.
V. RELATED WORK
Tsang and Beznosov where the first to analyze the security of
PTP in 2005 [15, 16]. They describe delay attacks briefly and
propose to average delay measurements as a countermeasure.
We argue that averaging delay measurements also averages the
malicious delay such that the attack is only barely mitigated.
The attack has even full effect as soon as the duration
of the attack is longer than the averaging interval5. The
4Sometimes, asymmetry is even intentional like with Ethernet where cables
are asymmetric by design to reduce far end crosstalk [14].
5And if the averaging interval is too long, the clock synchronization precision
may be negatively affected (since reacting on changes in the RTD would take
too long).
Fig. 3. PTP clock synchronization with delayed SYNC message.
authors furthermore propose to check for abnormal values.
But abnormal values (i.e., spikes in the measured clock offset)
only occur for simple delay attacks but not for incremental
delay attacks (as to be shown in Section VI-C).
PTP version 2 includes an experimental security extension,
Annex K [11], which provides message integrity and replay
protection. In Annex K, however, several flaws were discovered
and it was never properly formalized [17, 18]. In any case,
Annex K does not cover attacks in the time domain at all.
Interestingly, the PTP standard [11] mentions link asymmetry
(although in a single sentence only) but does not cover delay
attacks any further. We analyze asymmetric link delay attacks
in Section VIII and countermeasures against such attacks in
Section IX.
Network Time Security (NTS) [19, 20, 21] consist of a
set of Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) drafts that
aim at providing authenticity and integrity for unicast clock
synchronization protocols. Until now, NTS is only specified
for NTP and covers delay attacks briefly. A recently proposed
security extension to PTP [22, 23] aims to secure the 2-step
mode in PTP. The authors mention delay attacks in the extended
version of their paper but refer to related work when it comes
to countermeasures.
Ellegaard as well as Koskiahde, Kujala, and Norolampi
recommend MACsec to secure clock synchronization [24, 25].
Mizrahi analyzes IPsec and MACsec as means to secure clock
synchronization [26]. Delay attacks are very briefly mentioned
but the paper neither has details on how delay attacks can be
conducted or mitigated nor how IPsec and MACsec relate to
delay attacks. Treytl and Hirschler discuss the usage of IPsec
to protect PTP [27] but do not mention delay attacks at all.
Mizrahi states that encrypting clock synchronization traffic
makes it more difficult to conduct delay attacks [28]. We will
show that this holds true to some extent for selective messages
attacks only (Section VI), but asymmetric link delay attacks
(Section VIII) are not obstructed by encryption at all.
In [14], Yang, An, and Yu simulated delay attacks and
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propose a countermeasure based on hypothesis testing. Moreira
et al. discuss delay attacks briefly [18]. Ullmann and Vo¨geler
examined delay attacks on PTP and NTP [29] and propose
what we call bound clock offset by limiting the RTD as
mitigation. Lisova et al. provide a good analysis of the
consequences of delay attacks and discusses RTD limits as
countermeasure [30]. Other countermeasures discussed, such
as monitoring interarrival times, are unreasonable in a general
setting because those times will be equally affected by a delay
attack and cannot be used therefore as a countermeasure against
delay attacks. Mizrahi also briefly discusses RTD limits as a
potential countermeasure against delay attack [28], and so do
Annessi, Fabini, and Zseby [31].
Mizrahi proposes to use multiple paths between master and
slave to mitigate delay attacks [28]. The assumptions are quite
strong, however, as all paths need to be entirely (i.e., also
physically) independent and the adversary may only attack a
minority of paths successfully. From a practical perspective it
seems unrealistic to provide multiple low-latency paths with
low delay variation that are entirely independent. It is implicitly
assumed that the various networking components such as NICs,
routers, and switches are from distinct vendors and that paths
are symmetric. Furthermore, the countermeasure does not scale
well as it is more costly to establish new independent paths
than to compromise any majority of paths.
In recent work Narula and Humphreys developed a mathe-
matical model that defines necessary and sufficient conditions
for secure clock synchronization [32]. Focusing on conditions
that must be met in wireless networks to detect MITM attacks
on clock synchronization, the paper builds on earlier work [31]
to conclude that round-trip message exchange is a prerequisite
for secure clock synchronization and that one-way clock
synchronization can not be secured against delay attacks.
However, Narula and Humphreys rely on uniquely identifiable
clock synchronization messages in an isolated context and
maximum round-trip delays, whereas our work analyses the
much broader context of clock synchronization as part of real,
encrypted traffic.
Summarizing related work, research on secure clock syn-
chronization often either excludes delay attacks or refers
to related work for discussion on this issue. None of the
related work discusses delay attacks on encrypted clock
synchronization traffic in a realistic context, including detection
of clock synchronization traffic. Furthermore, related work
does not recognize the ability of clock synchronization slaves
to determine guaranteed bounds on their clock offset at a
specific point in time, nor does it identify the fundamental
limitation inherent to network-based clock synchronization:
clock synchronization can either be high-precision or secure
against delay attacks.
VI. SELECTIVE MESSAGE DELAY ATTACKS
To secure communications over untrusted networks the entire
communication is commonly encrypted and authenticated, for
instance with IPsec. For this reason, we tested delay attacks
with IPsec in tunnel mode6. In such scenario, the attacker has
access only to encrypted traffic, which means that there is no
information available about protocols, source and destination
ports, nor the IP addresses of the real endpoints.
In this section, we show that clock synchronization messages
can be reliably identified in an encrypted traffic stream with
reasonable effort. This identification of (encrypted) clock
synchronization messages builds the foundation for selective
message delay attacks. For this purpose, we aim to answer the
following questions:
• Are there any (statistical) properties of PTP traffic that
can be used to identify PTP messages within encrypted
traffic?
• Can PTP traffic be modified such that delay attacks can
be prevented or at least mitigated?
• Can encryption schemes provide reasonable security
against selective message delay attacks?
To answer whether it is possible to identify both PTP traffic
in general and specific types of PTP messages in encrypted
traffic, we conduct statistical traffic analysis of PTP traffic.
From this analysis, we identify several properties of PTP traffic
that build the foundations for selective message delay attacks.
We furthermore implement selective message delay attacks on
actual devices to show the feasibility of our proof of concept
in practice.
A. PTP Traffic Analysis
In order to make a slave adhere to a false time, either the
SYNC or the DELAY REQUEST message need to be delayed by
the adversary (as pointed out in Section IV). Depending on
the delaying of either SYNC or DELAY REQUEST, the slave’s
notion of time is going to be behind or ahead of the master’s,
respectively. When traffic is encrypted, traffic analysis is limited
to a restricted set of features: time, packet length, source, and
destination. In our specific case, each of these features can be
used to identify the particular type of PTP message in encrypted
traffic. The statistical properties identified in PTP in both phases,
i.e., clock offset measurement and delay measurement, are
closely related to timing, packet length, and packet direction.
One PTP clock synchronization cycle consists of a series of
four messages as highlighted in Section II. (1) A SYNC message
from the master to the slave. (2) Another message (FOLLOW UP)
from the master to the slave. (3) A message DELAY REQUEST
in the reverse direction from the slave to the master, and (4)
a message from the master to the slave (DELAY RESPONSE).
This series repeats at a fixed interval. Every two seconds we
observe another PTP message (ANNOUNCE) from the master
to the slave. The ANNOUNCE message is used for the Best-
Master-Clock algorithm, which we do not focus on in this
paper.
Our traffic analysis revealed some specific properties of
PTP traffic. These properties are the length of packets, the
timing, and the direction of messages. The lengths of the
6We have tested selective message delay attacks successfully against
commercially available systems like routers or protections switches that tunnel
PTP using security protocols different than IPsec, too. Methods and conclusions
are identical to the ones presented for IPsec tunnels for all tested systems.
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Fig. 4. PTP traffic patterns in timing, length, and direction.
packets are appealing as they are highly deterministic and
mostly constant. The reason for this is that the designers of
PTP wanted to avoid variation in the transmission delays
because of differences in packet lengths. Fig. 4 sketches
the results of our PTP traffic analysis. Firstly, all messages
from the master to a slave are of the same length and the
DELAY REQUEST message in the reverse direction is either of
equal length or slightly longer, which means that the length of
a PTP message is related to its direction. The specific lengths
of the messages depend on the underlying communication
protocols and on which layer the messages are observed. In
our setup, the lengths of (unencrypted) PTP messages were
86B and 96B for SYNC, FOLLOW UP, and DELAY RESPONSE
and DELAY REQUEST respectively (and 106B for ANNOUNCE
messages). In encrypted traffic, additional information is added
to the packet by the encryption scheme, increasing the packet’s
length. The packet lengths observed were 138B and 154B
in a test with IPsec encryption. Other encryption schemes
result in different lengths but the observed pattern persists.
Messages of length 154B occur every 2 s, which corresponds
to ANNOUNCE messages. The remaining packets with a length
of 138B occur every 250ms and in sets of 4 (which corre-
sponds to the SYNC, FOLLOW UP, and DELAY REQUEST and
DELAY RESPONSE messages). The length of encrypted PTP
messages are deterministic, as well, and therefore identifiable.
Secondly, we observe that PTP messages follow a specific
timing pattern. The FOLLOW UP message is sent from the
master with minimal delay (t0) after the SYNC message; the
DELAY REQUEST message is sent with a small delay (t1)
after the FOLLOW UP message was received by the slave;
and the DELAY RESPONSE is also sent immediately after the
DELAY REQUEST was received (t2) by the master. From the
adversary’s point of view t1 and t2 are roughly similar, which
is about the OWD between master and slave7. Because of their
periodicity, the observed timings are also visible in encrypted
traffic, as we will see later in this section.
Thirdly, the direction of the messages is fixed as long as
the master and slave roles persist. And this pattern repeats
periodically at a fixed interval (t3) for as long as the clock
synchronization service is running. This clock synchronization
interval can be configured and was left to the default setting of
250ms during our tests. Table I summarizes the results of our
traffic analysis. In Section VI-B we show how these properties
can be used to identify PTP traffic in a stream of encrypted
traffic.
B. Identification of PTP messages in Encrypted Traffic
In order to conduct a selective message delay attack on
an encrypted traffic stream, we first need to identify the
specific PTP messages within the encrypted traffic without
prior knowledge of the communications within that stream. To
this end, we setup a proof of concept to verify that specific PTP
messages can be identified within encrypted traffic. In a real-
world scenario, the specific setup will always be different, and
attackers may not have the plaintext communication available to
figure out the specific parameters of the setup (i.e., the specific
packet sizes, the PTP session interval, etc). Also, packet lengths
differ in encrypted traffic (as there is additional data added
by the encryption scheme) but the basic properties (frequency,
direction, timing and the relation of the lengths) persist.
Using the results of our PTP traffic analysis, we wanted
to know whether identifying PTP messages in encrypted
traffic is possible. For this purpose, we conducted some
experiments in which PTP communications were simulated.
The communication under test selects random timings t0, t1,
t2, t3, and random lengths x and y. The simulation takes
two parameters, the noise level and the time to observe the
traffic. Noise is added to the simulated PTP communication,
which is the probability to obtain a non-PTP packet of random
length every millisecond. Eventually, the script tries to estimate
t0, t1, t2, t3, and the lengths x and y just by observing the
communication.
This proof of concept relies on four assumptions:
1) Time is discretized with a sampling time of 1ms.
2) There is only one packet per time bin.
3) The pattern repeats all over the observation period.
4) t0, t1, t2, and t3 are constant from the perspective of
the sampling time.
Such assumptions draw some limitations for simulating
communications, but they are assumable since experiments
are intended to be proofs of concept and not fully-fledged im-
plementations. Real-world communications comprise additional
complexities that might defy the proof of concept detector, but
such situation can usually be faced by refining the detector (for
example, by using recurrence analysis, granger causality, or
markov models). Our goal is to show that the detection of the
pursued time parameters and lengths is theoretically possible
and feasible by the application of methods based on statistics.
7t1 and t2 are roughly similar if the attacker is positioned equidistant in
terms of time between master and slave. If the attacker is closer to either
master or slave, the difference between t1 and t2 increases — visible by
shifting the observation point to the left or to the right, respectively, in Fig. 4.
R. ANNESSI, J. FABINI, F.IGLESIAS, AND T. ZSEBY: ENCRYPTION IS FUTILE: DELAY ATTACKS ON HIGH-PRECISION CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION 7
TABLE I
IDENTIFIED PROPERTIES OF PTP TRAFFIC.
Message type Direction
(master-slave)
Length Timing
SYNC → 86B / 138B t3
FOLLOW UP → 86B / 138B t0
DELAY REQUEST ← 96B / 138B t1 ≈ t2 ≈ one-way delay
DELAY RESPONSE → 86B / 138B t2 ≈ t1 ≈ one-way delay
ANNOUNCE → 106B / 154B fixed interval (ignored)
t3 with regard to the last DELAY RESPONSE message, i.e., the clock synchronization interval.
Fig. 5. Experimental setup used to examine the effect of delay attacks on
PTP over an untrusted network.
Our simulations show that packet lengths, directions, and
timing are sufficient to separate PTP from other traffic and
even to identify the particular type of PTP message so that the
selective message delay attack can be conducted. If the noise
level is increased, the observation time needs to be increased
as well (as expected). Under our simulation conditions, at a
noise level of 99.9%, we need to observe the communications
for 1000 seconds to reliably determine the particular times and
lengths.
A challenging scenario for the detection would be the
occurrence of periodic signals with similar properties (timing,
lengths, and direction) within the same flow. We argue that
the properties of PTP are very particular and the chances
to encounter communications with similar properties in the
same traffic are very low. In the light of our experimental
results, we conclude that PTP traffic can be identified with
high probability within encrypted network traffic. For this
reason, selective message delay attacks can be conducted on
PTP even when it is (supposedly) secured with state of the art
network encryption schemes such as IPsec.
C. Experimental Results
Based on the statistical properties we identified in the traffic
analysis (Section VI-A) and the theoretical confirmation that
these properties can be used to identify PTP messages within
encrypted traffic (Section VI-B), we implemented a PTP traffic
detection and PTP message type identification on a real clock
synchronization system. We furthermore implemented selective
message delay attacks on actual devices to show the feasibility
of our proof of concept in a practical setting. Fig. 5 depicts
the experimental setup we used to evaluate the feasibility of
our proof of concept and to examine the effect of delay attacks
on real PTP systems over untrusted networks. We used three
Linux systems: one that runs as PTP master, another as PTP
slave, and the third acts as network bridge. Master and slave
were connected through an IPsec tunnel such that the bridge
could only observe encrypted traffic. PTP master and slave
both run PTPd version 2.3.1. Master and slave receive a GPS
PPS signal but only the master clock is synchronized to it.
With this setup, we can synchronize the master clock ±10 µs
to UTC, which is not overly precise but enough to highlight
the effect of selective message delay attacks. The slave clock
is synchronized to the master via PTP. To compare the slave
clock to the PPS signal, the “ppstest” tool8 was used.
Both systems are connected through an Ethernet bridge.
On the bridge, we implemented a MITM application that can
delay specific packets. The bridge is implemented with libnetfil-
ter queue9 so that packets are not only available in kernelspace
but also in userspace, which facilitates easier classification and
attack implementation. Since traffic is encrypted, a delay attack
in the value domain does not work because the timestamps
within the packets cannot be modified. Instead, the attack only
works in the time domain. In general, the adversarial application
on the bridge aims to identify PTP messages and delay specific
messages as soon as the selective message delay attack is
started. We expect that the slave clock is then desynchronized
from the master clock after a short time (due to an averaging
algorithm employed in PTPd).
1) Experiment 1: Delayed SYNC messages: In the first
experiment, we programmed our malicious application to delay
all SYNC (and FOLLOW UP) messages by 50ms. We chose
such large delay to stress that during such an attack the clock
synchronization cannot be considered high-precision any more.
Fig. 6 shows the results, i.e., the offset of the master and of
the slave clock to UTC during normal operation and during the
attack. The master clock is quite stable throughout the run of the
experiment, as expected. The slave clock spikes10 shortly after
the attack is started (at time 4122) and ended (at time 6632)
and settles around −25ms to UTC after a couple of seconds
throughout the attack. The master clock is not affected at all
by the selective SYNC-message delay attack, as expected. The
8https://github.com/redlab-i/pps-tools
9https://netfilter.org/projects/libnetfilter queue/
10Presumably, the overshooting in those spikes at the begin and at the end
of the attack is caused by the specific control algorithm implementation in
PTPd.
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Fig. 6. Offset to UTC during an selective SYNC message delay attack.
Fig. 7. Offet to UTC during a selective DELAY REQUEST message delay attack.
slave clock is affected, however, since the clock synchronization
messages of the master are delayed maliciously. The delay
attack operates as intended since the slave clock is around 25ms
behind the master’s during the attack.
2) Experiment 2: Delayed DELAY REQUEST messages:
The same setup was used in a second experiment. This
time, DELAY REQUEST messages were delayed 50ms by our
adversarial application on the bridge (instead of SYNC and
FOLLOW UP messages). For this reason the slave clock is
(roughly 25ms) ahead of the master’s clock during the attack
as shown in Fig. 7.
3) Experiment 3: Incremental delay attack: One may argue
that the spikes in clock offset at the start and end of the attacks
may raise a suspicion in security-critical environments. For this
reason, we also implemented selective message delay attacks
that incrementally add malicious delay. In that case (shown in
Fig. 8), the attacker does not apply the full malicious delay
from the moment the attack is started but instead incrementally
increases the malicious delay with each message. In this way,
there is no more spike in the slave’s time offset when the attack
starts. At time 3119 the incremental delay attack was started
as DELAY REQUEST messages were (increasingly) delayed by
1 ppm.
Fig. 8. Offset to UTC during a incremental selective DELAY REQUEST message
delay attack.
This incremental delay was deliberately chosen small (with
1 ppm) to highlight that such small delay is indistinguishable
from delay variation while still having a significant effect
on the clock’s precision. Despite the small incremental delay,
the slave clock is off more than 7ms to UTC after two hours,
which is completely unacceptable for most time critical systems
that rely on a precise notion of time. The slave cannot notice
the drift of its clock relative to the master’s because of the
incremental delay attack and is therefore convinced to be
perfectly synchronized.
4) Discussion: While the first two attacks might be de-
tectable due to the spikes in the clock offset at the start and
end of the attacks, the incremental attack cannot be detected
easily. Moreover, we argue later in Section IX that such
incremental delay attack cannot be prevented at all (only
be mitigated to some extent under specific circumstances).
Although the attacker can neither see the packets’ contents, nor
the real endpoints, nor ports, selective message delay attacks
can be conducted successfully. This indicates that encryption
alone cannot prevent selective message delay attacks on clock
synchronization.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST SELECTIVE MESSAGE
DELAY ATTACKS
In order to secure PTP from selective message delay attacks,
encryption of the communication is not sufficient. But there
exist two options to counter selective message delay attacks:
(1) prevent traffic analysis, and (2) mitigate the actual attack.
Both options will be discussed in this section.
A. Traffic Analysis Mitigation
Direction, timing, and packet length are sufficient to reliably
identify PTP traffic and the specific types of PTP messages. In
traffic analysis mitigation, the goal is to disturb traffic analysis.
For this purpose, we need to make sure that the observable
features entail no information that can be used to conduct an
attack. Those features are packet length, time, and direction.
While packet lengths are usually highly deterministic and
constant, they can be hidden by padding to a fixed length.
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Such padding can even be implemented without changing the
clock synchronization protocol. Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP) mode in IPsec, for example, supports payload padding
up to 255 padding bytes [33], and the Extension Header could
be used in IPv6 [34]. Alternatively or additionally Traffic
Flow Confidentiality (TFC) [35] could be employed to ensure
that all PTP messages have the same length. Alternatively,
random lengths could be used, but this would increase variation
of transmission delays (in addition to increasing bandwidth
requirements), which is detrimental to the goal of achieving
high-precision clock synchronization.
Nevertheless, padding alone is not sufficient for traffic
analysis mitigation since information about the time and the
direction are still sufficient to identify PTP packets (and
therefore to conduct selective message delay attacks). The
next feature that needs to be changed is the timing. Because
of the periodicity of PTP messages discovered in our PTP
traffic analysis, the specific messages can be identified reliably
even in encrypted traffic. Changing the timing, however, can
only be done from within the clock synchronization protocol
and not by external mechanisms. The offset measurement and
delay measurement could be separated, the offset correction not
executed periodically but in random intervals, and there could
be a random interval as well between SYNC and FOLLOW UP
messages. In this way, the timing properties of PTP could
hardly be used anymore to identify PTP packets reliably under
the assumption that sufficient cover traffic exists with similar
timing properties. The major downside of this method is that
it depends on the continuous existence of suitable cover traffic
over the entire path from master to slave, nevertheless. This
prerequisite of suitable cover traffic shifts the discussion to the
well-researched area of traffic obfuscation in order to protect
PTP from selective message delay attacks (even when traffic
is encrypted). Traffic obfuscation is known to be very complex
and its security highly depends on the specific threat model11.
The last feature that is used to prepare selective message
delay attacks is the direction of messages. As we have seen
from the traffic analysis (Section VI-A), the packets’ directions
are highly deterministic in PTP. There is no straight-forward
way to remove this feature.
B. Mitigation of Delay Attacks
In this section, we highlight two techniques to mitigate
delay attacks. The first technique relies on knowledge of the
underlying communication network and requires changes to the
clock synchronization protocol. The second technique builds
upon the replay protection of the encryption scheme. It needs
to be stressed, however, that both techniques are mitigation
only and cannot prevent the attacks. Table II summarizes the
results.
As the name suggests, the replay protection of a network
security protocol is supposed to prevent or mitigate replay
attacks (and has not been specifically designed to prevent delay
attacks). At the same time, however, the replay protection
also limits the maximum impact of selective message delay
11A special case here is that other periodic signals (that show similar
properties to those identified in PTP) could be used to mitigate traffic analysis.
attacks since packets cannot be delayed arbitrarily. The impact
of selective message delay attacks may be limited by maxing
the encryption scheme’s replay protection and assuring that a
sufficient number of packets per clock synchronization interval
are sent through the network as cover traffic. Replay protection
usually works as follows: a sequence number is added to the
packet, and the receiver accepts packets with strictly increasing
sequence numbers only or with sequence numbers from a
certain window to allow packets to overtake other packets in
the network. While not specifically designed for this purpose,
such replay protection also limits the impact of delay attacks
since packets will not be accepted by the receiver if too many
other packets have been received meanwhile. For this reason,
the maximum impact of the selective packet delay attack is
directly related to the replay protection and to the number
of packets per clock synchronization interval at the network
location the attacker has access to.
Therefore, replay protection should be configured strictly
(when possible) such that overtaking of packets is not allowed
at all. Packets may still be delayed maliciously, however, until
the subsequent packets arrive. Also, the attacker may drop or
delay the subsequent packets as well in order to increase the
malicious delay for the PTP packets. If there are no additional
security measures in place such delay or drop of packets will
not raise any suspicion. In any case, the strict replay protection
in conjunction with sufficient packets per clock synchronization
interval may limit the impact of selective message delays. It
needs to be stressed that this mitigation depends on additional
cover traffic within the entire network path from master to
slave (and vice versa) which may not be under the defender’s
control. Furthermore, strict replay protection is not feasible in
all scenarios because reducing packet loss rate may be more
important in some scenarios than stricter replay protection.
Countermeasures asymmetric link delay attacks (i.e., limiting
OWDs - to be introduced in Section IX) are also applicable as
countermeasures against selective message delay attacks (but
countermeasures against selective message delay attacks are
not applicable to asymmetric link delay attacks).
VIII. ASYMMETRIC LINK DELAY ATTACKS
In Section VI we introduced selective packet delay attacks,
in which the attacker aims to identify PTP messages (in an
encrypted traffic stream) in order to delay specific PTP packets
selectively. In this section, we present an additional delay
attack, which we denote in the following as asymmetric link
delay attack. In such asymmetric link delay attack, the attacker
delays all packets in one direction of the link but not in the
other (e.g., all packets from the master to the slave are delayed
maliciously but those from slave to master are not).
In order to analyze how delaying all packets in one direction
affects clock synchronization we use the example discussed
in Section IV. This time, however, we delay all packets sent
by the master to the slave without delaying the messages
sent by the slave to the master as illustrated in Fig. ??. The
slave eventually calculates the offset according to Eq. (2) as 3
(again we assume for simplicity reasons that clocks are neither
desynchronized nor drifting). The miscalculated clock offset
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TABLE II
LIST OF COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST SELECTIVE MESSAGE DELAY ATTACKS.
Countermeasure Benefit Drawbacks Preventsattack
Random send and reply times Confuses traffic analysis based on timings Requires protocol changes and depends
on cover traffic.
No
Equal (or variable) message lengths Confuses traffic analysis based on lengths Variable lenghts reduce precision and
depends on cover traffic.
No
Strict replay protection Limits max. impact of the attack Not feasible in all scenarios No
Limiting OWDs Limits max. impact of the attack Requires knowledge of the underlying
communication network.
No
Fig. 9. Asymmetric link delay attack where the master→slave link is delayed.
Fig. 10. Asymmetric link delay attack where the slave→master link is delayed.
(3) is half of the delay asymmetry while the real clock offset is
0. For this reason, the slave sets its clock backwards by 3 time
units. If the attacker conducts the attack in reverse direction
(i.e., the packets from slave to master are maliciously delayed
but the packets from master to slave are not, see Fig. 10),
the slave miscalculates the offset as −3 (according to Eq. (2))
when it is actually 0. For this reason, the slave will set its
clock ahead by 3 time units.
Fig. 11. One-way delays in clock synchronization.
An attacker who conducts an asymmetric link delay attack by
delaying all packets in one direction can, therefore, manipulate
the clock offset by half of the asymmetric delay. The attacker
can also influence the sign of the malicious offset correction by
choosing which direction of packets are delayed maliciously.
Link asymmetry being closely related to clock offset correction,
two questions arise: (1) what is the exact relation between clock
offset correction and link asymmetry, and (2) can asymmetric
link delay attacks be prevented? These two questions will be
examined in the remainder of this section.
When analyzing clock synchronization messages in detail,
the first message is sent at tM1 by the master and received
at tS2 by the slave. In the case of a hypothetical zero-delay
link, the difference tS2 − tM1 would represent the exact offset
of the slave clock relative to the master. As pointed out in
Section II, clock synchronization messages in real systems
experience various (constant and stochastic) delays along their
path from master to slave and vice-versa. The receiving time
tS2 as well as the slave-computed clock offset incorporate the
sum of all of those delays.
In practice, transmission and propagation delays account for
main part of the clock synchronization message end-to-end
delay. This is why clock synchronization protocols comprise
delay measurement methods to infer on applicable delays in
order to compensate for them. On top of these measurements,
high-precision clock synchronization protocols such as PTP
propose dedicated functionality in intermediate devices (so-
called transparent clocks in routers and switches) to compensate
for queuing and processing delays within intermediate systems,
even though those delays typically amount to a minor part of
the overall delay.
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To facilitate the compensation of delays, two assumptions are
required: (1) the relative clock drift within one measurement
interval is negligible, and (2) the OWDs are symmetric, i.e.,
the sum of delays from master to slave equals the sum of
the delays from slave to master. Fig. 11 shows the OWDs
d1 and d2 in the general case. The offset of the slave at
time tS2 is offset(tS2) = tS2 − tM1 − d1 and at time tM4
is offset(tM4) = −tM4 + tS2 + d2. The offset is always
calculated from the perspective of the slave so that the master
inverts its offset calculation (as the offset of the slave clock
relative to the master is the inverse of the offset of the
master clock relative to the slave). The fact that always the
slave’s offset is calculated can be exploited by an attacker
that maliciously alters delay asymmetry, even if the attacker
does neither know the content of a message (because it is
encrypted) nor its type (because traffic is perfectly obfuscated).
The direction alone is sufficient to manipulate the measured
clock offset.
The assumptions mentioned above are essential to compen-
sate the delays as the OWDs are approximated as half of
the measured RTD. If those assumptions do not hold true,
the system of two equations and four unknown variables in
Eq. 3 cannot be solved. The first assumption (relative clock
drift is negligible during one measurement interval) implies
that the clock offset at time tS2 should be almost identical
to the offset at time tM4. For this reason, one variable is
eliminated as offset = offset(tS2) = offset(tM4). The
second assumption (symmetric delays) helps to eliminate
another variable as d = d1 = d2, where d1 is the delay from
master to slave and d2 is the delay from slave to master as
shown in Fig. 11. This way, we end up having two equations
with two variables that can be solved.
In an asymmetric link delay attack an attacker exploits the
assumption on symmetric delays. Assuming that there is a
common part d in OWDs and additional two distinct delays
δ1 and δ2 for both directions (as shown in Fig. 11), the two
offset equations are as follows:
offset(tS2) = tS2 − tM1 − d− δ1
offset(tM4) = −tM4 + tS3 + d+ δ2
(3)
such that the offset can be calculated as
offset =
tS2 − tM1 − tM4 + tS3 − δ1 + δ2
2
(4)
as long as offset(tS2) ≈ offset(tM4) holds true. The
symmetric delay component d is completely eliminated from
the equation but δ1 and δ2 remain. If the delay is symmetric,
then they cancel each other (as δ1 = δ2) so that the offset can
be calculated precisely. But if the delays are not symmetric,
offset calculation will be off by δ2−δ12 , which is in the interval[
−δ1
2 ,
δ2
2
]
given that an attacker will eventually minimize either
δ1 and keep δ2 close to zero or keep δ1 close to zero and
maximize δ2.
IX. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ASYMMETRIC LINK
DELAY ATTACKS
In this section, we propose a method that facilitates defining
maximum guaranteed bounds for the clock offset of the
Fig. 12. Theoretical (worst case) offset uncertainty bound calculation.
slave relative to the master. For the following discussion
we assume that master and slave clocks are synchronous
at time tS0 = TM1 = 0 and that there is no clock drift
during one clock synchronization interval. All PTP messages
are cryptographically signed and encrypted, so the MITM
can not modify timestamp values within these messages. The
FOLLOW UP message is omitted, and we assume that the slave
immediately sends the DELAY REQUEST after reception of
the SYNC message, i.e., tS3 = tS2, for sake of simplicity.
However, it is important to stress that neither the initial clock
synchronization nor the immediate sending of DELAY REQUEST
are a prerequisite for the proposed method. This is essential for
avoiding DELAY REQUEST message collisions from multiple
slaves following SYNC multicasts by the master, which could
cause link-layer collisions in the network. However, the
(in)equations below consider already separate timestamps tS2
and tS3, so slaves can use random delays after receiving SYNC
to avoid potential collisions.
In Fig. 12, the master sends the SYNC message at time
tM1 = 0 and receives the slave’s DELAY REQUEST at time
tM4 = 14. The slave receives the master’s timestamp tM4 = 14
in the DELAY RESPONSE message and computes the RTD as
14 (according to Eq. 1). The default assumption of PTP is
that communication paths are symmetrical and, therefore, the
timestamps tS2 = tS3 must be mapped to the center of the
master’s interval, i.e. tS2 = tS3 = 7 as shown in Fig. 12.
Unless there is specific information available on physical
delays for the forward and reverse communication path, it
must be assumed that the delay of one or both of these
paths can be (close to) zero. This gives an adversary the
opportunity to arbitrarily delay the master’s SYNC message
on the forward path or the slave’s DELAY REQUEST message
on the reverse path within the given window of 14 time
units (as shown in Fig. 12). The MITM adversary can
forward the master’s SYNC message without additional delay
(SYNC EARLY) and delay the slave’s DELAY REQUEST EARLY
message by 14 time units, resulting in slave timestamps
tS2-early = tS3-early = 0. Alternatively, the adversary can
delay the master’s SYNC message (SYNC LATE) and forward
the slave’s DELAY REQUEST LATE message without additional
delay, resulting in slave timestamps tS2-late = tS3-late = 14.
Therefore, depending on which scenario the adversary MITM
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Fig. 13. Offset uncertainty bound calculation using one-way delay limits and
unsynchronized clocks.
adopts, it can shift the slave’s offset within [−7, 7] time
units (according to Eq. (2)). Whenever the slave depends on
maximum guaranteed bounds of its clock offset, this uncertainty
must be considered.
Bound Clock Offset With Knowledge on OWDs
In order to reduce the uncertainty and guarantee bounds
on the clock offset, we present a method that builds upon
knowledge on physical parameters and constraints of the
clock synchronization’s communication path. In this way, the
attacker’s ability to conduct delay attacks is reduced, and the
slave is supported in determining stricter guaranteed bounds
for its clock offset. It is worth noting that the method can only
mitigate delay attacks but not prevent them entirely.
We assume that the communication path is asymmetric
and its minimum OWD is known for both directions. We
denote the minimum OWD from master → slave as dMSmin and
the minimum OWD for slave → master as dSMmin. The exact
measurement of OWDs depends on precisely synchronized
clocks, which is why in real-world scenarios dmin may be
approximated using topology and physical parameters like
propagation-, transmission- and processing delays of the net-
work path’s links and components. A mandatory precondition
for guaranteed clock offset bounds is that the approximated
OWD must be less or equal to the minimum real packet delay
on the path. Conservative approximations on dMSmin and d
SM
min,
i.e., lower minimum OWD values are detrimental to the offset
bounds but are essential to guarantee the bounds in adversarial
settings.
For computing guaranteed offset bounds using dMSmin and
dSMmin, the slave first measures the RTD according to Eq. (1). In
Fig. 13 the forward communication path from master to slave
has a known minimum OWD of dMSmin = 2 and the reverse
path a minimum OWD of dMSmin = 6 time units. Relying on
the minimum delay constraints, whenever the slave receives
the master’s SYNC message it knows that the master assigned
timestamp tM1 at least dMSmin = 2 time units earlier then
the slave’s reception timestamp tS2. The slaves also knows
when sending its DELAY REQUEST message that the master will
receive it and assign timestamp tM4 at least dMSmin = 6 time
units later then slave time tS3. Using this knowledge and the
timestamp tM4 it received in the master’s DELAY RESPONSE
message, the slave can rely on the inequalities (5a) and (5b)
to hold true.
Assuming an (unknown) clock offset offset between the
slave and master clocks, the slave can define the causal ordering
of timestamps using the inequalities Eq. (5a) and Eq. (5b).
All terms except the offset being known, by reordering the
inequalities the slave can bound its clock offset after a clock
synchronization interval by Eq. (5c).
tM1 + d
MS
min + offset ≤ tS2 (5a)
tM4 ≥ tS3 + dSMmin − offset (5b)
tS3 − tM4 + dSMmin ≤ offset ≤ tS2 − tM1 − dMSmin (5c)
Applying Eq. (5c) to the scenario in Fig. 13 yields bounds of
[−6, 0] for the early case tS2 = tS3 = 2 and [0, 6] for the late
case tS2 = tS3 = 8, which maps to the uncertainty window
depicted in the figure. In order to obtain a clock offset bound
that centers around 0 (despite asymmetric communication
path and delay attacks), we suggest replacing clock offset
calculation from Eq. (2) by Eq. (6), which basically averages the
minimum and maximum offset, assuming that the uncertainty
(i.e., difference between the measured RTD and the sum of
the minimum OWDs dMSmin and d
SM
min) affects the forward or
reverse link with equal probability. In Fig. 13 the average offset
is mapped to the center of the marked uncertainty window.
This yields a symmetrical interval for guaranteed clock offset
bounds that formally satisfy Eq. (7) with RTD = tM4 − tM1.
For the scenario in Fig. 13, the new offset calculation results
in the same size of the uncertainty window (i.e., 6) but the
offset within [−3, 3] centered around 0 (according to Eq. (7)).
The knowledge of the physical delay therefore allows a stricter
bound of the guaranteed clock offset compared to the case
without knowledge on the OWDs presented in Fig. 12. In this
way, the adversary’s degree of freedom in manipulating clock
synchronization is effectively decreased and the guaranteed
bounds on the clock offset are improved.
offset =
offsetlow + offsethigh
2
=
tS2 − tM1 − dMSmin + tS3 − tM4 + dSMmin
2
(6)
−RTD − d
MS
min − dSMmin
2
≤ offset ≤ RTD − d
MS
min − dSMmin
2
(7)
While the clock offset can be guaranteed after a clock
synchronization interval (Eq. (7)), the question about the clock
offset that can be guaranteed for a particular system remains
open as an attacker could still increase the RTD arbitrarily
(and therefore manipulate the clock offset). To prevent such
clock offset manipulation, the RTD that is accepted needs
to be restricted. Intuitively, the lower the maximum RTD
that is accepted (RTDmax), the tighter the bound on the
clock offset that can be guaranteed, but also the higher the
probability of clock synchronization intervals to be discarded
during unfavorable network conditions.
R. ANNESSI, J. FABINI, F.IGLESIAS, AND T. ZSEBY: ENCRYPTION IS FUTILE: DELAY ATTACKS ON HIGH-PRECISION CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION 13
In order to derive clock offset bounds for a system, a time
TI needs to be defined that represents the maximum time
interval between any two consecutive clock synchronization
intervals with RTD ≤ RTDmax. Between two consecutive
clock synchronization intervals, the slave clock drifts at most
TI ·|ρ|, with ρ being the maximum relative clock drift of slave
and master clocks. Generally one can say that the smaller the
network the smaller RTDmax, the better the network operations
the smaller TI , and the better the clocks the smaller ρ. Eq. (8)
shows the guaranteed clock offset bounds for a system.
−RTDmax − d
MS
min − dSMmin
2
− TI ·|ρ| ≤ offset
offset ≤ RTDmax − d
MS
min − dSMmin
2
+ TI ·|ρ|
(8)
While the relative clock offset can be bounded, it needs to
be stressed that high-precision clock synchronization requires
significantly tighter clock synchronization guarantees than can
be provided by the bounds in Eq. (7) and (8). Deterministic
networks might help as they provide guarantees on the
maximum RTD and delay variation, but they depend on a
precise notion of time themselves in the first place.
It is worth noting that slaves can apply the algorithm that has
been described above for the SYNC and DELAY REQUEST mes-
sage round-trip for the DELAY REQUEST DELAY RESPONSE
message exchange, too. The PTP protocol does not eval-
uate the DELAY RESPONSE message’s delay as part of its
operation, which is why the SYNC and DELAY REQUEST
message exchange is the preferred one for clock bounding.
However, the slave could acquire the DELAY RESPONSE re-
ceiving timestamp and use it to compute clock bounds for
DELAY REQUEST DELAY RESPONSE. One possible application
is, for instance, the detection of selective SYNC message delays
conducted by a resource-limited adversary. The clock offset
bounds of the SYNC DELAY REQUEST round-trip being sub-
stantially larger (inaccurate) than the one of DELAY REQUEST
DELAY RESPONSE could be a strong indication of an ongoing
selective delay attack. Still, the general observation holds true:
none of these methods can protect against an asymmetrical
link delay attack that an adversary with unlimited resources
can conduct.
X. CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION: EITHER PRECISE OR
SECURE
The outcome of Section VIII that an attacker can manipulate
offset correction by
[
−δ1
2 ,
δ2
2
]
through link asymmetry raises
the question whether a clock synchronization protocol can
be designed that handles link asymmetry such that its offset
calculation remains unaffected in an adversarial setting. We
argue that constructing such protocol is impossible as delay
cannot be distinguished from clock offset. Main reason is
that link asymmetry can only be measured with synchronized
clocks, and it can not be guaranteed that the link asymmetry
is constant (especially in an adversarial setting). Synchronized
clocks would be required in the first place to measure link
asymmetry in order to have secure clock synchronization after
all, which is circular reasoning.
If we suppose an oracle to exist that can instantaneously read
the clocks of master and slave, the oracle has knowledge of the
real clock offset (according to Eq. (2)) and is not influenced
by link asymmetry. The clock offset measured by the slave
also includes the link asymmetry (Eq. (9)), however.
offsetmeasured = offsetreal +
δ2 − δ1
2
(9)
If the oracle analyzes two consecutive offset measurements
(at time i and i+1) during which clock offset was not corrected,
it would observe that the difference between the offsets
measured at time i and at time i+1 consists of two distinct parts:
(1) the change in the real offset (offsetreali+1−offsetreali ) that
is a result of the relative clock drift between slave and master,
and (2) the change in the link asymmetry that is determined by
delay variation (
δ2i+1−δ1i+1
2 −
δ2i−δ1i
2 ) such as network jitter
for example.
The relative clock drift, which determines the change of the
real offset, depends on the quality of the physical oscillators
used and typically ranges from 101 to 10−6 ppm. The delay
variation is highly indeterministic and depends on various
factors such as the current network load as well as the
quality of the network and its components. Delay variation
typically ranges from 105 to 102 ppm. Important to note is
that delay variation is by several orders of magnitudes larger
than the relative clock drift, and that only an oracle could
distinguish the change of the real clock offset from the change
of the link asymmetry. For master and slave, however, they
are indistinguishable as only the sum of the change can be
observed in terms of measured clock offset. This means that
an attacker can exploit this indistinguishability to conduct and
hide an asymmetric link delay attack. As soon as a clock
synchronization protocol aims to achieve high precision, it
needs to entail delay measurements in order to compensate for
delays. And this delay compensation mechanism is susceptible
to asymmetric links because link delay variation cannot be
separated from clock drift.
The other issue is the direction of messages. To conduct an
asymmetric link delay attack, the attacker only needs to know
the direction of messages, which is tied to the master and slave
roles because it is always the clock offset of the slave relative to
the master that is calculated. Delaying messages in one direction
has the inverse effect on clock synchronization than delaying
messages in the reverse direction (as the slave clock should
be synchronized to the master and not the other way around).
For this reason we conclude that no clock synchronization
protocol can be designed that is precise and prevents delay
attacks entirely (even when messages are obfuscated in terms
of length and timing and cover traffic exists).
If clock synchronization protocols can be either high-
precision or secure against delay attacks, then applications
must not rely on a precise notion of time when employing
untrusted communication networks — if applications rely on
a precise notion of time, then they must only be executed in
trusted environments. This conclusion is (not limited to but)
especially important to critical infrastructures.
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XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focused on attacks against clock syn-
chronization protocols in the time domain, which means that
protocol message content is not altered and only the timing
of messages is changed. One assumption is that the attacker
is in a privileged network position12. We first conducted a
statistical traffic analysis of PTP and identified properties of
PTP traffic with regard to timing, packet length, and packet
directions. We showed that these properties can be used to
identify PTP messages in encrypted traffic in order to conduct
selective message delay attacks.
We explored various countermeasures to mitigate selective
message delay attacks. The first set of countermeasures aims
to obstruct traffic analysis. To this end, PTP can be modified
in a way that randomizes the timings and the use of packet
length padding, although such modification may have a negative
impact on the clock synchronization’s precision. Security,
nevertheless, depends on the existence of suitable cover traffic,
which leads to the field of traffic obfuscation. Furthermore, strict
replay protection should be activated if possible to minimize
the impact of the attack (and to make the attack easier to detect
as the packet loss rate increases).
Then we introduced asymmetric link delay attacks. While
asymmetric link delay attacks have potentially lower impact
on clock synchronization’s precision, we found that they are
fundamentally tied to the goal of high-precision. Bounding the
uncertainties of the clock offset by applying knowledge of the
physical parameters of the communication path (i.e., limiting
OWDs) ensures that individual messages cannot be delayed
arbitrarily. Until now, network-based clock synchronization
protocols asked for deterministic delays, and delays could
be either symmetric or have a known asymmetry to be
compensated by the PTP configuration. The results show
that knowledge of the underlying communication networks is
essential to mitigate delay attacks and to safeguard maximum
guaranteed bounds on clock offset. Nevertheless, asymmetric
link delay attacks can only be mitigated but not be prevented
entirely.
We argue that no high-precision clock synchronization
protocol can exist that prevents asymmetrical link delay attacks
entirely because of the delay compensation mechanism that
is required to achieve high-precision. In adversarial settings,
an attacker can manipulate the delay variation in such a way
that links become asymmetric and clock offset calculation is
impaired maliciously since clock drift and delay variation can-
not be distinguished. This implies that clocks synchronization
cannot be arbitrarily precise while maintaining security against
delay attacks. This finding contradicts the common belief that
clocks synchronization over untrusted networks can be secured
by encryption and authentication methods, while improving
precision. Given the results from this paper, we argue the
12While we assume the difficulty of gaining such privileged network position
is within the power of an attacker who attacks critical infrastructures, we
think that asymmetric link delay attacks specifically might be conducted even
from non-privileged network positions by influencing the queues of network
devices in a particular direction (for example by sending an excessive number
of packets).
contrary: clock synchronization can either be precise or secure
against delay attacks (but not both!).
Delay attacks are an inherent threat for high-precision
clock synchronization since the times when messages are sent
and received have an actual effect on the precision of clock
synchronization and even small differences can have a large
impact. The impact of those delay attacks can only be bounded
but those attacks limit the precision of clock synchronization,
nevertheless. Practically achievable limits are certainly stricter
than some critical infrastructure applications assume today.
Those infrastructures are supposed to improve specific areas
but also introduce a new attack vector by their strict dependency
on a precise notion of time.
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